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Consumer Finance and Financial Repression  
in China 
 
Evan Oxhorn* 
China is rapidly becoming the world’s largest consumer market.  As 
the number of middle-class Chinese consumers has grown, so too 
has the size of China’s consumer finance system.  To date, there has 
been little scholarship on consumer finance in China.  This article 
takes a first step at filling this gap in the literature.  It argues that 
China’s consumer finance system is fundamentally a tool of the 
state, which uses “financial repression” of Chinese consumers to 
acquire capital through shadow taxation.  This political-legal 
system allows reallocation of consumers’ capital for political 
purposes and underwrites China’s rapid growth.  But cheap 
consumer capital has primed the Chinese economy for an economic 
collapse by encouraging unsustainable asset bubbles.  Ironically, 
this very problem makes it impossible for China to liberalize its 
consumer finance system, lest a shortage of easy capital precipitate 
a collapse.  China’s elite are also against financial liberalization 
because it is not in their personal interest.  Ultimately, meaningful 
liberalization of China’s consumer finance system is unlikely 
                                                
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. in Chinese Language and Culture, 
Georgetown University.  Mr. Oxhorn wishes to thank Professor Adam Levitin for his 
invaluable advice in writing this article, as well as Professor James V. Feinerman, Joshua 
Dyer, and Joseph Quinlan. 
398 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
because change would require the type of political-legal 
liberalization which China’s government has been unwilling to 
pursue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2009, one of China’s richest women, twenty-eight-
year-old Wu Ying, was sentenced to death.1  Ying received the death 
penalty for running an informal finance organization after evidence of 
financial improprieties appeared. 2   Commentators speculate that her 
                                                
1 Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.economist.com/economist-
asks/chinas_entrepreneurial_boom_risk_political_crackdown.  Several associated 
individuals also received long sentences.  Id. 
2 Id. 
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spectacular punishment in a country where informal finance is both illegal 
and widespread arose from losing money invested by politically connected 
individuals or from her lack of investment in political “protection.”3 
While Ying’s sentence may have been payback for losing the 
wrong people’s money or for failing to pay kickbacks, it also fired a 
warning shot at Chinese considering unofficial finance channels.  It 
appears the supreme penalty was meted out not just as a personal vendetta, 
but with the goal of suppressing informal finance.  This suppression 
protects the supremacy of the official financial channels controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to enhance its power. 
This article argues that controlling the consumer finance system is 
an important and largely unexamined component of how the CCP 
maintains its power.  China’s political-legal structure grants the 
government almost total control over the consumer finance system.  In 
turn, this enables the CCP to redirect consumers’ capital to support its 
political programs.4 
The importance of the consumer finance system as a means of 
steering domestic savings to politically-favored investments represents an 
example of what the development economics literature terms “financial 
repression,” namely, the use of financial regulation as a means of political 
control.  Financial repression is used to bolster myriad government 
policies enhancing political stability; it forms the foundation of China’s 
political economy. 
The CCP uses the promise of financial growth to perpetuate its 
power.  Consequently, it exerts a heavy hand in financial markets to fulfill 
this promise.  One way it does this is through establishing a set of policies 
that incentivize consumer savings while simultaneously adopting policies 
limiting investment opportunities.  These policies induce citizens to 
deposit their savings at state-owned banks.5  State-owned banks use the 
                                                
3  Xiangyang Tang & Ruoji Tang, Considered Opinion: The Wu Ying Case, ECON. 
OBSERVER, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/Politics/2011/04/19/199377.shtml. 
4 The Chinese Communist Party and the government of China are normatively distinct 
entities, but for the purposes of this paper, they will generally be used interchangeably to 
refer to China’s leadership. 
5 A deposit is functionally a loan to a bank, with the interest rate on the deposit being 
equivalent to the interest rate paid on a loan.  In free market systems, banks redeploy the 
capital accumulated through deposits by investing in projects that they expect to offer a 
return greater than the interest rate they pay to the depositors.  This is what is known as 
“spread” lending, with the spread being the difference between the return on the 
investments and the interest rate paid to depositors.  China, however, uses its banking 
system as a way of directing capital to enterprises chosen by the state based on political 
criteria, rather than on market criteria.  By encouraging deposits in state-run banks, the 
CCP creates a discrete domestic funding source for projects the state—not the market—
chooses to fund.  This system’s key advantage is that it is an incredibly cheap funding 
source:  the CCP controls the interest rates paid to depositors, which it keeps at negative 
rates.  Depositors actually pay the state-run banks for the privilege of lending the state-run 
banks money, money which the banks then use for subsidized lending to state-owned 
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deposits to subsidize the government and allied sectors, which creates jobs 
and drives GDP.  Accordingly, meaningful consumer financial reform is 
unlikely because the local government and state-owned enterprises are 
heavily dependent on this highly-subsidized captive funding source.  
Many of these entities would be unable to attract investment in a free 
market system, yet these entities are essential to employment and social 
stability.6  Financial repression is also a useful tool in minimizing the 
impacts of China’s rapidly mushrooming public debt.7 
This article’s examination of the role of the Chinese consumer 
finance system in the Chinese political-legal system adds to both the 
political and legal literatures on China and to the comparative literature on 
consumer finance.8  The current legal literature on the world’s second-
largest economy has so far avoided looking behind the curtain at the legal 
and extra-legal norms shaping China’s consumer financial system.9  These 
norms indicate that while the Chinese consumer economy is booming and 
there is explosive growth of a Chinese “middle class,” China has not 
developed the sort of robust consumer finance system that facilitates the 
consumption and investment activities typical of the middle classes in 
developed nations.10 
With a weak world economy, weaning enterprises and local 
governments from captive funding created by financial repression would 
be an economically perilous endeavor, derailing China’s already slowing 
economy.  A weakened economy would rupture the social compact 
between the CCP and citizens, threatening the CCP’s grip on power by 
upsetting social stability.  With inflation rampant, a once-in-a-decade 
                                                                                                           
enterprises and local governments.  See Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast, 
Fuelling Fears of Excessive Credit Growth, infra note 33. 
6 See Keith Bradsher, China’s Grip on Economy Will Test New Leaders, N.Y. Times, Nov. 
9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/10/world/asia/state-enterprises-pose-test-for-
chinas-new-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing SOEs’ “hammerlock on a long 
list of strategic industries” in the context of China’s latest leadership transition, their role 
as providers of blue-collar jobs, and the “thorny political issues” that continue to impede 
meaningful reform). 
7 Cf. Minxin Pei, Are Chinese Banks Hiding the ‘Mother of all Debt Bombs?’, THE 
DIPLOMAT, Sept. 10, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/10/are-chinese-banks-hiding-
the-mother-of-all-debt-bombs (discussing the “ticking debt bomb” of China’s reliance on 
bank credit to fuel its way clear of the global recession, the central government’s extension 
of local governments’ deadlines to repay by administrative fiat, and other disturbing 
aspects of the shadow banking system, including significant off-balance sheet debt). 
8 For example, Reinhart & Rogoff’s survey of financial repression literature includes only 
one mention of China—from 1932.  Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, A Decade 
of Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16827, 2011). 
9 Other articles mention financial repression in China in passing without exploring the 
issue.  See e.g., Ken Miller, Coping With China’s Financial Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
July/Aug. 2010, at 96–109. 
10 That said, because of China’s massive population and rapid GDP growth, there will still 
be plenty of opportunities as financial markets expand. 
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leadership transition imminent, and an economy starting to slow down, 
large-scale reforms are unlikely. 
Even if such risky reform was considered, the structural and 
cultural norms of China’s political-legal system and its benefits to the 
nation are fundamentally incompatible with consumer finance 
liberalization.  A weak judiciary and corrupt local governments are 
unlikely to enforce meaningful modifications because they benefit from 
the current system.  And like “pork barrel” spending in America, 
controlling—and capturing—the flow of consumer capital is a benefit that 
elites are loathe to surrender.  Despite inefficiencies, the centralized nature 
of China’s current system is well-suited to handling an uncertain 
economic future.  China will not be interested in pursuing large-scale 
political liberalization essential for a liberalized consumer finance 
environment. 
While consumer finance has recently attracted attention as a legal 
topic in America, virtually nothing has been written about consumer 
finance China, the world's largest consumer market by number of 
consumers.11  This article is a first step in that direction. 
II. THE CCP USES FINANCIAL REPRESSION TO SECURE ITS 
POSITION AND STRENGTHEN CHINA 
The CCP’s legitimacy rests on continued economic success.  Like 
a bicycle that topples over when it moves too slowly, China has pushed 
policies to maintain a growth rate above 8% to generate enough economic 
opportunities to maintain political stability.12  All national government 
financial decisions are consequently based on perpetuating this growth.13 
                                                
11 For the studies introducing the concept, see EDWARD S. SHAW, FINANCIAL DEEPENING IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1973), and RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (The Brookings Inst. ed. 1973).  For a more recent study of this 
governmental practice, and associated techniques for eliminating government debt, see 
generally Carmen R. Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia, The Liquidation of Government 
Debt (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16893, 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/pdf/crbs.pdf.  See also Carmen M. 
Reinhart et al., Financial Repression Redux, FIN. & DEV., June 2011, at 22–26 (discussing 
a resurgence of financially-repressive government policies during the recession and 
referencing the Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011 NBER paper); The Great Repression, THE 
ECONOMIST, June 16, 2011 (discussing the sovereign debt build-up in the economic crisis, 
and suggesting financial repression as one possible governmental response). 
12 This goal has recently been revised down to 7%.  Simon Cox, Pedalling Prosperity, THE 
ECONOMIST, May 26, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21555762. 
13 Matthew Sweeney, Note, Foreign Direct Investment in India and China: The Creation 
of a Balanced Regime in a Globalized Economy, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 232 (2010). 
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With such growth, China’s middle class is rapidly expanding.14  
These consumers earn enough disposable income to choose whether to 
consume today or save their money for later.  Financial repression is a 
series of political-legal policies that shift the benefits of consumers’ 
capital from the individual to the state.  China has implemented policies to 
encourage consumers to save most of their earnings in state-owned 
banks.15  China then redistributes this capital to politically important 
projects.  Many of the defining characteristics of modern China’s 
successful political-economy are underwritten through this redistribution.  
Consequently, China is unlikely to abandon the benefits provided by 
financial repression without good cause. 
A. Financial Repression 
Financial repression occurs when a government uses its coercive 
power over law, policy, and regulations to siphon private-sector capital 
towards government policies. 16   Unlike direct taxation, financial 
repression is invisible to most consumers, even though it similarly 
decreases their incomes.  Financial repression reached its apex in the West 
between the 1940’s and 1970’s as nations used it to reduce war debts; it 
still remains popular with developing nations.17 
A common example of financial repression is an indebted State 
pursuing an inflationary monetary policy to reduce the amount of money it 
must ultimately repay.  Many nations still practice light financial 
repression by limiting investment opportunities, requiring pension funds 
to purchase government debt, capping interest rates, and regulating cross-
border capital flows.18  In its more extreme form, nations seize citizens’ 
property, reallocate their capital, grant state-owned enterprises monopoly 
positions, and subsidize industry with consumer capital. 
China uses all of the above methods to operate a highly 
financially repressive regime.19  Chinese citizens have few investment 
opportunities in-country;20 Chinese citizens are allowed limited access to 
                                                
14 China’s middle class is predicted to grow to between 600 and 800 million people by 
2025.  DIANA FARRELL ET AL., FROM ‘MADE IN CHINA’ TO ‘SOLD IN CHINA’: THE RISE OF 
THE CHINESE URBAN CONSUMER (McKinsey Global Inst. 2006), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/urbanization/from_made_in_china_to_sol
d_in_china. 
15 See infra. text pp. 402–05. 
16 Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 8, at 4. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4–5. 
19 Miller, supra note 9, at 96. 
20 Cf. Julia Werdiger & Bettina Wassener, Chinese Investors Flock to London to Buy Real 
Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, at B1 (describing the growth of under-the-table 
Chinese property purchases abroad as one of the best investments available to wealthy 
Chinese). 
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overseas investments; 21  interest rates on deposits are low or even 
negative; 22  and China tightly regulates capital outflows. 23   Local 
governments in China frequently dispossess property to pursue real estate 
development,24 capital is constantly reallocated away from consumers and 
their choices, and the economy is dominated by consumer-subsidized, 
state-owned enterprises.25 
B. China Intentionally Creates High Savings Rates 
China’s household savings rate is astronomical—up to 29% of 
urban household income is saved.26  China uses political-legal tools to 
keep the savings rate high in order to provide the government with a large 
pool of additional capital to fund political goals.  The CCP has created a 
society where consumers must possess an independent financial ability to 
acquire capital to pay for critical life-events otherwise paid for by the state 
in developed nations. 
China’s weak social safety net is a principle reason for high 
savings.  Many Chinese are saving for retirement as the nation begins a 
period of rapid graying resulting from the one-child policy.27  The need to 
save for retirement affects all Chinese, and is compounded by China’s 
brittle social safety net, which requires citizens to pay for healthcare, 
unemployment, and disability insurance, and even for primary education.28 
Another reason the Chinese save so much is that the government 
has created a financial system where middle-class citizens have access to 
                                                
21 Miller, supra note 9, at 98. 
22 Tom Orlik, Eating Bitterness in China’s Financial System, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME 
REPORT (Mar. 18, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/18/eating-bitterness-
in-china%E2%80%99s-financial-system/?KEYWORDS=china+banking. 
23 Aileen Wang & Koh Gui Qing, China Sees Pressure From Rising Capital Inflows: 
Official, REUTERS (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/27/us-china-
economy-hot-money-idUSTRE73Q0W720110427. 
24 See e.g., Chinese Cabinet Warns Over Eviction of Farmers, XINHUA (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/04/content_12272823.htm (discussing abuse 
by local governments in forcing the eviction of farmers). 
25 There are around 120 such organizations.  STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND 
ADMIN. COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL [GUOWUYUAN GUOYOU ZICHAN JIANDU GUANLI 
WEIYUANHUI], YANG QI MINGLU [LIST OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES], 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html (listing 117 state-owned 
enterprises in late 2012). 
26 Marcos Chamon, et al., The Puzzle of China’s Rising Household Saving Rate, VOX (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6028. 
27 Bob Davis, Chinese Savings Binge to End?, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME REPORT (Feb. 
15, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/02/15/chinese-savings-binge-to-end. 
28 See generally Juann H. Hung & Rong Qian, Why is China’s Savings Rate So High? A 
Comparative Study of Cross-Country Panel Data (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 
2010-07, 2010). 
404 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
few safe investments.29  China’s weak financial disclosures and poor rule 
of law mean that its stock markets more resemble a casino than a true 
market.30  The lack of transparency, non-existent consumer protection 
NGOs, and oppressive censorship prevent investors from getting the 
information they need to make rational investments.31  China’s capricious, 
corrupt government, weak corporate governance, and lack of transparency 
reward get-rich-quick investment strategies based more on timing the 
market than on fundamentals. 32   Sensible investors avoid the stock 
markets.  For the average citizen, options for foreign investment are 
limited, local stock markets are risky, unofficial investments can get you 
killed, and savings accounts provide a low rate of return.  After savings, 
therefore, those that can afford it invest in real estate. 
Similar to American hedge funds, wealthy Chinese have access to 
loosely regulated financial trusts that pursue various investments directly 
and offer depositors a higher rate of return.33  But even these investment 
vehicles are shut down by the government from time to time.34  At the 
same time, the government keeps most investor capital inside China, 
restricting overseas investment by individuals to less than $50,000 per 
annum.35  These factors combine to restrict even wealthy consumers’ 
investment opportunities, while funneling consumer capital toward the 
State’s goals. 
A shortage of consumer credit further fuels the high savings rate, 
forcing Chinese consumers to fund most purchases through savings 
instead of credit.  Many of China’s rural banks are saddled with bad loans 
                                                
29 While deposits at state-owned banks are guaranteed by the treasury as “too big to fail,” 
deposits at private banks have no such protection.  China has long debated the merits of 
such a plan, but there are still no concrete plans.  In a further sign of the structural 
implications of financial repression in China, it is reportedly the state-owned banks which 
most oppose deposit insurance.  Keith Bradsher, China Pushes Deposit Insurance in Bank 
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/business/global/china-is-said-to-consider-plan-to-
deal-with-failed-banks.html. 
30 See generally Suananda Sen, Finance in China After WTO, 40 ECON. & POL. WEEKLY 
565 (2005) (discussing disclosure rules).  Xiangyang Huang, It’s Time to Clean Up the 
Stock ‘Casino’, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-
03/08/content_14784047.htm (discussing the casino-like aspects of China’s stock market). 
31 See Elizabeth Spahn, Nobody Gets Hurt?, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 861, 894–95 (2010). 
32Andy Xie, Trapped Inside a Property Bubble: When China’s Real Estate Bubble Finally 
Bursts While Exports Become Less Competitive, the Consequences Could be Severe, 
CAIXIN ONLINE (Jan. 10, 2010), http://english.caing.com/2010-01-10/100106991.html. 
33 Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast, Fuelling Fears of Excessive Credit 
Growth, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/18118975. 
34 Cf. Simon Rabinovitch, Chinese Banks Fight for Deposits, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3ba4e690-f7ec-11e0-a419-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1qXjzMua1. 
35 Miller, supra note 9, at 98. 
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and unable to access government relief.36  Consequently, they provide 
almost no credit to many Chinese.37  Traditionally, China’s consumers and 
entrepreneurs have relied on their savings in concert with informal credit 
services to finance large purchases.38   The informal loan industry is 
estimated at $2.6 trillion dollars annually.39  The interest rates on informal 
loans range from 18% to 200%, and the loans rarely extend past two 
years.40  Informal loans are less than ideal, and their high rates are likely 
to discourage consumers from tapping into them except in the most 
extreme situations.  Consequently, Chinese rationally opt for high savings 
rates. 
As the story of Wu Ying demonstrates, however, these illegal 
informal credit networks are being discouraged.41  While the informal 
credit system is too vast to be completely quashed, it currently faces 
significant pressure, which will hurt consumers in need of capital.42  In 
theory, this shift in demand away from informal markets could lead larger 
banks to roll out more consumer-focused products, but, as will be 
explained below, this is unlikely. 
The weakness of China’s credit markets is at least partially 
intentional, allowing the CCP to limit the development of independent 
power bases.43  China has a robust entrepreneurial system at the local level, 
which entrepreneurs can fund through informal means and personal 
savings. 44   However, there are very few regional-, and even fewer 
                                                
36 See Sen, supra note 30.  But see China Encourages Rural Bank Development, CHINA 
DAILY, Oct. 22, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-
10/22/content_15835313.htm (describing the government-promoted expansion of new 
rural banks, albeit funded with private capital). 
37 Frank Langfitt, Boom in Shadow Financing Exacts High Toll in China, NPR, Oct. 25, 
2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141552651/boom-in-shadow-financing-exacts-high-
toll-in-china. 
38  Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE 
ECONOMIST, supra note 1. 
39 Sen, supra note 30. 
40 See China’s Economy: Bamboo Capitalism, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2011, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/18332610. 
41  Is China’s Entrepreneurial Boom at Risk From a Political Crackdown?, THE 
ECONOMIST, supra note 1. 
42 China has announced recent plans to restrict informal credit even further.  Chris Buckley 
& Kim Coghill, China’s Wen Sees Progress in Inflation Fight, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-china-economy-wen-
idUSTRE7941F420111005. 
43 Credit can be an exponential force in the creation of independent power, because it can 
be re-loaned.  Well-functioning credit markets display a strong multiplier effect.  For 
example, Bank A loans to Factory B, which extends a 60-day credit to Retailer C, who 
sells a car with “no money down” to Consumer D.  As these systems proliferate, the State 
loses control over key levers of the economy, especially when a creditor, like Retailer C, is 
not part of the State. 
44 See Lingling Wei, Small Companies Teeter as Beijing Tightens Lending, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 1, 2011), 
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national-level private firms.45  A robust credit market with limited state 
control is necessary for entrepreneurs to expand beyond their local 
markets, but these firms could also become private economic forces 
capable of threatening the CCP.  Perpetuating weak credit markets 
maintains firms’ dependence on the CCP for capital, increasing the CCP’s 
political supremacy.46 
Credit cards represent a bright spot of consumer finance growth in 
China.  Accounts grew from eleven million in 2004 to one hundred and 
twenty-four million in 2008, with an estimated 42% of urban residents 
now owning one.47  Credit cards represent a bright spot of consumer 
finance growth in China.48  But Chinese consumers approach credit cards 
differently from their Western counterparts.  In China, just 6% of 
transactions are made with credit cards.49  Banks have pursued credit cards 
to attract deposit accounts; they understand that they are offering a 
convenience service, not a loan. 
There are obviously other factors contributing to the high savings 
rate not tied directly to financial repression.  First, a massive gender 
imbalance has emerged as a malignant side-effect of China's one-child 
policy, as female fetuses are selectively aborted to ensure that a family’s 
"one" child is male.50  To attract a bride, young men—and their families—
are competing fiercely to save enough to attract ever-fewer potential 
brides with the lure of a comfortable life.51  Second, modern China's 
history of instability encourages liquid savings in case of disaster.52 
                                                                                                           
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576602200899086370.html?g
rcc=88888&mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_world. 
45 See id. 
46 On the other hand, many argue that the recent financial crisis in America and its 
aftermath exemplify the opposite problem.  Instead of banks in the hand of the government 
as in China, problems arise when government is in the hand of banks.   E.g., Kevin Drum, 
Capital City, MOTHER JONES (Jan.–Feb. 2010), 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/01/wall-street-big-finance-lobbyists. 
47  Nin-Hai Tseng, Why China Won’t Charge It, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/02/14/news/international/china_credit_cards.fortune/index.htm.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See generally Brenda Cronin, Competition for Brides Fuels High China Savings, WALL 
ST. J. CHINA REALTIME REPORT (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/10/competition-for-brides-fuels-high-china-
savings (stating that there are “1.15 pre-marital-age men for every one woman” in China 
today, and discussing impact of this on China’s high savings rate). 
51 Shang-Jin Wei & Xiaobo Zhang, The Competitive Saving Motive: Evidence From Rising 
Sex Ratios and Savings Rates in China (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 15093, 2009). 
52  In the past hundred years China experienced the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the 
Republican Era, the Warlord Era, the Japanese occupation and war, the Nationalist Era, the 
Communist revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and finally, 
Reform and Opening policies of the past thirty years. 
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The effectiveness of China's pro-savings policies become clear 
when one realizes that China experiences these astronomical savings rates 
despite interest rates that are nearly two points below inflation, meaning 
depositors lose 2%—and even 3%—of their deposited capital annually, in 
real terms!53  With inflation recently reaching a thirty-two month high,54 
these deposits are becoming even less valuable.  As will be explained 
below, extraordinary savings rates and low interest payments are the 
foundation on which China builds its economy.  While some of the 
reasons for the high savings are outside of the government's control, the 
persistence of a weak safety net and limited social services when China 
has trillions of dollars in reserves, coupled with poor investor protections, 
limited investment opportunities, and inadequate consumer credit, is 
consistent with the view that the State actively works to promote high 
savings.55 
C. State-Owned Banks Subsidize Key National Policies Through 
Reallocating the Proceeds of a Shadow Tax on Consumer 
Deposits 
China's banking sector is dominated by state-owned banks (SOBs), 
which control 77% of consumer deposits.56  Unlike America's Federal 
Reserve, which only sets target interest rates, the People's Bank of China 
(PBC) sets the actual interest rates paid on SOBs' loans and deposits.57  
                                                
53 See, e.g., Trust Belt: Trust Companies are Growing Fast, Fuelling Fears of Excessive 
Credit Growth, supra note 33 (reporting close to a 2% loss on deposits); Rabinovitch, 
supra note 34 (reporting the same figure as a 3% loss). 
54 Paul Sonne & Laurie Burkitt, China Fines Unilever for Price Comments, WALL ST. J. 
(May 7, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703859304576306401272168750.html?m
od=WSJ_hp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection. 
55 There are a litany of other reasons cited in support of the reserves, including aiding 
exporters, controlling inflation, and geopolitical investments.  But the importance of 
deposits should not be discounted.  Essentially, consumers’ negative interest rate deposits 
function as a quasi-treasury that the government can use as it sees fit through the state-
owned banks without having to raise taxes.  At the same time, China has indicated it 
intends to strengthen its social safety net during the next five years.  KPMG, CHINA’S 12TH 
FIVE-YEAR PLAN: CONSUMER MARKETS (Apr. 2011), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/cn/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-
12th-Five-Year-Plan-Consumer-Markets-201104.pdf. 
56 Sen, supra note 30, at 566.  Another estimate for 2004 shows SOBs controlling 54% of 
assets, joint-stock commercial banks controlling 15% of assets, cooperatives with 9% of 
assets, policy banks with 8% of assets, city-owned banks controlling 5% of assets, foreign 
banks with 2%, and other banks making up the remaining 7%.  KPMG, CHINA’S CITY 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS? 4, 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/China-
banks-Opportunity-knocks-200703.pdf.  However, policy banks and city-owned banks still 
receive a high level of national government oversight.  Id. 
57 Michael Pettis, What Makes Mr. Zhang Save?, 33 THE WILSON Q. 61 (Summer 2009). 
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The PBC has kept both rates extraordinarily low, resulting in an excess of 
cheap loans issued by SOBs.58  These low interest rates effectively act as a 
shadow tax on Chinese depositors, imposing a negative rate of return on 
deposits equivalent to 65% of consumers’ income tax payments.59  SOBs 
utilize the low consumer deposit interest rates to subsidize low interest 
loans to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local governments.60 
China remains wedded to the benefits derived from low interest 
rates on large consumer deposits, despite evidence that consumers would 
prefer a banking system designed for their benefit.  For example, in early 
2011, SOBs demonstrated significant initiative by tapping into this latent 
consumer demand.61  In just a few short months, SOBs used regulatory 
loopholes to create a hundred billion-dollar market for alternative deposit 
instruments offering positive interest rates.62  Despite the benefits of these 
instruments for SOBs and consumers, Chinese regulators banned these 
products in less than a year.63  The message to SOBs was clear:  financial 
repression will be maintained, despite consumer demand. 
Essentially, the SOBs, the SOEs, and local governments are all 
subsidized through consumer deposits.64  To protect SOBs' balance sheets 
from losses on their uneconomic loans, the PBC must continue to maintain 
its low interest rate policy, perpetuating this misallocation of capital.65  
The CCP has every incentive to maintain low interest rates to keep the 
bicycle from toppling over.  Leftist commentators eagerly awaiting the 
rise of China's financial sector to counterbalance what they view as a 
malignant Wall Street66 appear oblivious to the fact that China’s financial 
sector is built directly on the appropriation of Chinese citizens’ capital. 
                                                
58 Id. 
59 Orlik, supra note 22.  Income tax in China is in principle designed to be progressive, 
with rates ranging from 5 to 45%.  Overview of China’s Tax System: Individual Income 
Tax, BEIJING LOCAL TAXATION BUREAU, http://english.tax861.gov.cn/zgszky/zgszky09.htm 
(last accessed May 17, 2011). 
60 James A. Dorn, The Debt Threat: A Risk to U.S.-China Relations, 14 BROWN J. WORLD 
AFF. 151, 160 (2008); cf. Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 8, at 6 (describing the general 
framework of consumer deposits subsidizing government loans). 
61 See Rabinovitch, supra note 34. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Dinny McMahon & Jason Dean, Fitch’s Bold Call on China Banking-System Risk, 
WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME REPORT (March 9, 2011), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/03/09/fitch%E2%80%99s-bold-call-on-china-
banking-system-risk/. 
65 The majority of SOB’s profits come from the roughly three percent spread earned on 
consumer deposits as a result of artificially low interest rates.  Orlik, supra note 22; Pettis, 
supra note 57, at 61. 
66 See e.g., Thomas Ehrlich Reifer, Lawyers, Guns and Money: Wall Street Lawyers, 
Investment Bankers and Global Financial Crises, Late 19th to Early 21st Century, 15 
NEXUS J. OP. 119 (2009/2010). 
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The PBC is responsible for maintaining China's exchange rates as 
well. 67   China's currency, the renminbi (“RMB”), is not a freely 
convertible currency and is not expected to become convertible in the near 
term.68  American manufacturers allege China's currency is undervalued 
by 40%. 69   These low exchange rates subsidize China's export 
manufacturers by making Chinese goods relatively inexpensive on the 
world market.70  China maintains its weak currency by sending hundreds 
of billions of dollars, largely from consumer deposits, abroad.71  As a 
result of this outflow subsidized by consumer deposits, there is less money 
inside China to compensate depositors through interest rates.  Consumer 
deposits effectively subsidize China's manufacturing and export sector, a 
key driver of China's spectacular economic growth. 
The independent China Banking Regulatory Commission directly 
regulates Chinese banks' compliance with prudential banking 
regulations.72  At the same time, the State Council (China's cabinet) 
directs general economic policy through bank lending, and sometimes 
directly pushes specific loans to promote political goals.73  The PBC 
oversees implementation of these policies. 
This uneconomic approach to lending is a legacy of the SOBs’ 
original mission of funding government initiatives for purely political—
not economic—reasons. 74   Although SOBs have gained significant 
autonomy since the 1980s, there exists conflicting evidence over whether 
the banking sector is sufficiently self-interested to ensure its safety.75  For 
example, China's Premier, Wen Jiabao, recently ordered banks to accept 
more non-performing loans from small and medium entrepreneurs.76  
During the financial crisis, banks responded to similar political requests 
by loosening lending.77  And as the recent crackdown on alternate deposit 
                                                
67 Sen, supra note 30, at 566. 
68 Miller, supra note 9, at 97. 
69  Joe McDonald, Struggling to Cool Inflation, Beijing Turns to Last-Ditch Tool of 
Allowing Stronger Yuan, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.winnipegfreepress.com/breakingnews/struggling-to-cool-inflation-beijing-
turns-to-last-ditch-tool-of-allowing-stronger-yuan-120945384.html. 
70 Orlik, supra note 22. 
71  Christopher D. Luer, Note, Red Banking: Chinese State-Owned Commercial Bank 
Reform and the Basel II Accord, 20 MINN. J. INT’L. L. 171, 183 (2011). 
72 Sen, supra note 30, at 570. 
73 Sen, supra note 30, at 565. 
74 Luer, supra note 71, at 174–75; see also Yuwa Wei, An Overview of Corporate 
Governance in China, 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 23, 29 (2003). 
75 Cf. Richard Wu, The Changing Regime for Regulating Loans of State-Owned Banks in 
China: Towards a System of Prudential Banking, 26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 107 (2009) 
(arguing Chinese banks are moving stutteringly toward a profit-based lending regime). 
76 Buckley & Coghill, supra note 42. 
77 At the same time, China has promised such reforms for years, and many are skeptical 
that banks will significantly expand lending to small and medium enterprises.  Wei, supra 
note 44. 
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instruments demonstrates, the State is actively discouraging 
entrepreneurial activity by SOBs that may distract them from their prime 
purpose of issuing political loans. 
The SOBs can survive issuing these non-economic political loans 
because they are backed politically and economically by the State.  SOBs 
have received tens of billions of dollars from the treasury to write off bad 
loans to SOEs.78  SOBs also benefit from the political-legal policies that 
create large interest spreads on consumer deposits, allowing them to 
disburse political loans to state-owned enterprises and local governments 
at low rates79 with less concern about repayment.80 
State-owned enterprises dominate China’s economy.  SOEs are 
massive, near-monopolies run by Party members and their cronies to 
achieve State goals.81  China's SOEs increasingly pursue funding through 
equity markets, but still acquire considerable amounts of cheap capital 
from SOBs.82  They also dominate the economy.  Fifteen of the twenty 
largest companies traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are SOEs.83  
Foreign countries complain that China’s policy of creating “national 
champions” by subsidizing SOEs through easy capital unfairly distorts 
world markets and disrupts international trade.84  These subsidies are paid 
for through China's financial repression policies. 
The continued weakness of SOB loan portfolios gives loan 
officers a strong incentive to lend to politically-backed entities, like SOEs 
and local governments, instead of consumers.  Just as “no one ever got 
fired for buying IBM,” few loan officers ever suffered for lending to an 
SOE.  As a further example of the uneconomic nature of SOBs, loan 
officers lack incentives to pursue politically riskier—but economically 
rewarding—loans to private individuals, even when sufficient collateral is 
present.85  With loans providing such low government-mandated interest 
rates, SOBs can ill afford to lose money from defaults by parties whose 
losses are not backed by the State.  Until the government lessens financial 
repression to make it politically and economically safer for banks to lend 
to consumers, SOBs have little financial justification to develop a robust 
                                                
78 Sen, supra note 30, at 566. 
79 Orlik, supra note 22. 
80 Cf. Reinhart & Rogoff, supra note 8, at 5. 
81 See YANG QI MINGLU, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
82 See Sen, supra note 30, at 565. 
83 William Gamble, Why State Ownership of Enterprises Will Not Go Away, MONEY LIFE 
(May 16, 2011), http://www.moneylife.in/article/why-state-ownership-of-enterprises-will-
not-go-away/16409.html. 
84 See Doug Palmer, U.S. Raises Concerns About China’s State-Owned Firms, REUTERS 
(May 4, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/usa-china-
idINW1E7FI02O20110503 (citing a U.S. State Department official who expressed concern 
over Chinese “state-owned enterprises” receiving regulatory advantages over American 
competitors). 
85 China’s Economy: Bamboo Capitalism, supra note 40. 
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consumer finance industry.  At the same time, an increase in loan interest 
rates to compensate for the increased risk of consumer lending would 
undermine SOEs’ access to cheap capital (an essential foundation of the 
national economy), unless the government deregulated rates or created a 
tiered system.  Significant consumer financial liberalization is unlikely 
where it could undermine politically-influential SOEs. 
Most developed and developing nations, including China, have 
signed on to the BASEL series of international agreements.86  Basel sets 
international standards for banking.  BASEL II limits uneconomic loans.  
Although some argue that BASEL II’s risk-based capital requirements 
prevent uneconomic loans by making such loans too expensive for banks 
in terms of the capital that they must hold against such loans,87 the 
effectiveness of such regulations must be questioned due to the billions of 
dollars of uneconomic loans China politically forced its banks to issue 
during the financial crisis.88 
Lending in China decreased throughout 2011,89 indicating that 
China’s SOBs may now be too exposed to bad loans to pursue good risk 
or implement reform.  One reputable analyst predicted China will 
experience a banking crisis by 2013 due to these bad loans and the more 
than $1 trillion in other risky loans to government-backed entities issued 
off of SOB balance sheets.90  China’s SOBs are aware of the risk, and 
claim to have a handle on the situation.91  Similarly, Chinese regulators 
are increasing capital adequacy ratios to 11.5% to limit risk,92 with SOBs 
actually maintaining higher capital adequacy ratios indicating a defensive 
position.93  Regardless of whether China’s banks fail, uneconomic lending 
and high capital-adequacy ratios crowd out opportunities for consumer 
loans by diminishing the amount of capital available for loans.94 
Equally important, China’s success at maintaining strong growth 
through two financial crises demonstrates a key benefit of its political 
economy:  centralized control allows the government to rapidly implement 
                                                
86 Parties to the BASEL Convention: List of Parties and Signatories, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/Countries/Statusofratifications/PartiesSignatories/tabid/1290/languag
e/en-US/Default.aspx. 
87 However, there is some reason to believe that China will not faithfully implement the 
agreement.  See Pettis, supra note 57, at 186–87, 196–97. 
88 See Orlik, supra note 22. 
89  REUTERS, China Drafts New Rules on Bank Capital Adequacy (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/15/china-banks-idUSL3E7JF0Z920110815. 
90 Most analysts dispute the short-term risk.  See, e.g., Rabinovitch, supra note 34. 
91 Lionel Barber & Jamil Anderlini, ICBC Plays Down Credit Boom Risk, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 
28, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2ca96956-596b-11e0-bc39-
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92 See Orlik, supra note 22. 
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94 See Sen, supra note 30, at 567. 
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policies in the face of economic danger.95  In the most recent crisis, China 
implemented a “lend first, clean up the mess later” program to escape the 
downturn.96  For example, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
the world’s largest bank, loaned nearly $100 billion to local governments 
in the aftermath of the crisis, which now accounts for ten percent of its 
loan portfolio.97  Many observers believe the easy, plentiful loans to SOEs 
and local governments, subsidized by consumer deposits, allowed China 
to maintain its high growth rate.98  The strategy could again be successful 
at heading off future crises, and with world markets still unstable, China is 
likely to preserve one of the core strengths of its system instead of 
liberalizing consumer finance. 
Foreign banks will not exert significant pressure to pursue 
financial liberalization.  Foreign competition for Chinese consumers 
emerged in concert with preparations for China’s WTO ascension in 
2001.99  The initial reforms focused heavily on governance and the safety 
of the banking system by limiting bank exposure to non-performing 
loans.100  As is typical in China, however, these regulations were blunted 
by weak implementation.101  This resulted in weaker protections with less 
pressure for reform on banking competition.  In 2009, when profits at 
SOBs saw double-digit gains, foreign banks like HSBC saw profits 
collapse by as much as 60% in China.102  In the same year, foreign banks’ 
Chinese market share fell from 2.16% to 1.71%.103  This is due to myriad 
subtle regulatory obstructions foreign banks face mixed with external 
pressures the banks experienced during the financial crisis.  Foreign banks 
are too small and burdened by external challenges to create competitive 
pressure in the banking sector in the mid-term.104  Therefore, they will not 
be a driving force for reform. 
China also uses consumer deposits to underwrite foreign aid and 
diplomacy.  SOBs frequently issue generous below-market loans to 
foreign nations—to build a port, for example—on the condition that an 
                                                
95 While implementation is often difficult in China, officials fall in to line when the 
national government makes a policy a priority.  Sen, supra note 30, at 568. 
96 Barber & Adnerlini, supra note 91. 
97 Id. 
98 Decelerating: China’s Government May at Last Be Getting a Grip on its Banks, THE 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18396286. 
99 Richard Wu, supra note 75, at 127–30. 
100 Id. at 128–29. 
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of judgments and court directives), problems registering loan securities, and large numbers 
of illegal or unenforceable mortgages.  Richard Wu, supra note 75, at 134–36. 
102 McMahon & Dean, supra note 64. 
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http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance_investment/2010/05/06/169378.shtml.  
104 McMahon & Dean, supra note 64.  
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SOE acquires the construction contract.105  SOBs loaned an estimated $10 
billion to developing nations in 2009.106  These loans play a key role in 
increasing China’s diplomatic influence as Western nations retrench after 
the financial crisis.  Often these loans include exclusive mercantilist 
access for SOEs to exploit a developing country’s resources—resources 
which China then uses to fuel its own economic growth.107 
In sum, China’s financial sector is not designed to serve 
consumers’ needs.  The financial system is a political-legal tool used by 
the central government to pursue policies foreign and domestic.  The State 
uses financial repression to create huge consumer deposits at SOBs.  
SOBs then use the artificially large spread on deposits from financially 
repressed consumers to pursue State policies.  There is little chance of 
consumer financial liberalization because it would undermine social 
harmony, weaken China’s largest companies and local governments, 
disrupt the underpinnings of the export economy, limit China’s ability to 
respond to a future financial crisis, and constrain China’s foreign 
policy.108  These vast deposits are an easy source of capital for banks in 
the face of weak loan portfolios and an uncertain world.  Furthermore, 
financial repression is preferable to direct taxation because of its subtlety, 
which helps maintain social harmony.  Until the government finds another 
means of addressing all these problems, at a time of less macro-economic 
risk, consumer financial reform will be negligible. 
III. CONSUMER FINANCIAL REFORM IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH 
CHINA’S POLITICAL-LEGAL STRUCTURE 
This section explores the incompatibility between China’s 
political-legal structure and consumer financial liberalization.  In 
communist China, every legal decision is political.  Consumer financial 
liberalization would be ineffective without broad political-legal reform on 
all levels of government to provide space for private economic actors.  
The CCP is unlikely to pursue reform because reform would undermine 
social harmony while limiting its power.  The non-independent judiciary 
will be unable to enforce laws without large-scale reforms sufficient to 
shift the balance of power between China’s government branches.  Local 
governments and their leaders are also unlikely to implement reform 
because they depend on the status quo for easy capital and government 
revenue. 
                                                
105 See Miller, supra note 9, at 105. 
106 Id. at 105. 
107 Id. at 106. 
108 See Wang & Qing, supra note 23. 
414 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
A. China’s Governmental Structure Makes Reform 
Difficult to Implement 
The Chinese national government sets broad economic policies 
and national goals, but leaves financial regulation to the ministries and 
much enforcement to local governments.  The consequence of this 
relationship is that the consumer financial industry is designed to promote 
political goals, export-oriented industrial growth, social stability, and 
patronage at the expense of consumers.109  China’s central government has 
acknowledged it faces growing challenges and is striving to make some 
reforms.110  However, the conflicts of interest and structural limitations to 
reform that arise from China’s local judiciary and local governments make 
meaningful change unlikely absent a wholesale overhaul. 
In China, government actions are not carried out according to the 
rule of law when their result conflicts with the CCP’s needs.  A vicious 
cycle exists wherein these extra-legal government actions beget new 
problems requiring new extra-legal solutions.111   Contrary to popular 
belief, however, the CCP is not a monolithic entity.112  It is composed of 
various factions ranging from Keynesian capitalists to red Maoists.  As a 
result, although the rule of law in China is weak, it is not always clear 
which faction will be making the arbitrary decision. 
No matter which faction is deciding, the principle of preserving a 
“harmonious society” runs through almost every decision made by the 
national government, although factions may disagree on how best achieve 
this principle.113  It appears that China’s leaders believe that the benefits 
provided by current financial regulations preserve harmony more than 
reform would, further imperiling the prospect of reform.  This is in part 
because pro-consumer structural changes would lead to severe financial 
losses amongst SOBs, SOEs, and local governments, which depend on 
consumer capital to fund many of the activities which promote social 
harmony. 
Liberalization will be avoided because it is volatile, 
simultaneously disrupting the economy while limiting government 
resources available to maintain social harmony and political repression.  
The political changes needed for meaningful liberalization of China’s 
consumer finance system, include, inter alia, enhanced property rights, 
due process, and a more predictable regulatory state, but require the CCP 
                                                
109 See Sen, supra note 30, at 565. 
110 See Guoguang Wu, China in 2010, 51 ASIAN SURVEY 18 (2011). 
111 Id. at 18. 
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to reform China’s politics by limiting its power, something it is unwilling 
to do.114 
B. China’s Weak Judiciary is Structurally Incapable of 
Protecting Citizens’ Property Rights 
China’s judiciary is not structurally independent of other state 
organs.  Judges are removable for displeasing political officials.115  They 
are promoted for making politically smart decisions, with judges’ salaries 
paid directly out of the local Parties’ general funds.116  The judiciary’s 
weakness also comes from inexperienced judges, a poor record 
management system for determining property rights, and debtors’ ease of 
hiding assets.117 
While China’s constitution appears to offer consumers protection, 
in reality, constitutionally enumerated rights are generally inadmissible in 
court.118  China’s weak judiciary hamstrings lenders from recovering debts 
and pursuing financial innovation.  The weak judiciary undermines the 
prospect of a liberalized consumer finance regime because banks are, 
rightfully, unwilling to issue loans to individuals without a practicable 
method of vindicating their interests.119  Investors also have difficulty 
vindicating their rights through the law. 
Developing a truly meaningful consumer finance regime would 
require a judicially enforceable makeover of China’s political economy:  
corporate transparency and governance would need to be improved; a 
degree of judicial independence would be required to enforce contracts 
and protect consumers’ rights, especially when a branch of the 
government or SOE was party to litigation; government regulators would 
need to be bound by stronger notice requirements to allow markets to 
                                                
114  Cf. From Sun to Mao to Now: Uncomfortable Comparisons for an Authoritarian 
Government, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, available at 
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reflect fundamentals instead of luck; at a minimum, freedom of the 
business and legal press would need to be protected, and bribery and 
backroom deals would need to be minimized to create opportunities for 
the best companies to succeed.120  The judiciary is not currently strong or 
independent enough to ensure that these reforms could be maintained, 
even if these reforms were created by statute. 
Successful legal reform is, indeed, feasible in modern China.  
Over the past decades, China successfully reformed the sliver of its 
judiciary and regulations that dealt with foreign businesses, creating the 
legal conditions for attracting massive foreign direct investment.121  But 
reforming this small slice of China’s judiciary created no political risk for 
the CCP because it dealt mainly with foreigners, thus lacking an impact on 
the internal harmony of Chinese society.  Consumer financial 
liberalization would be different; the CCP will not implement the reforms 
necessary for a strong, independent judiciary because such a judiciary 
would represent too strong check on the CCP. 
C. China’s Local Governments are too Dependent on the Status 
Quo to Implement Consumer Financial Reform 
Even where the national government adopts liberal consumer 
finance policies, they are likely to receive inconsistent enforcement at the 
local level.  The problems on the central government level pale in 
comparison to those on the local level. 122   Local governments are 
generally run for political ends with little concern for efficacy.123  This 
makes implementing laws and pursuing consumer protection especially 
challenging. 
Local People’s Congresses (LPCs), the local arm of the CCP, 
oversee local governments and are generally composed of low- and mid-
level party officials who concurrently serve in local government posts.124  
Since LPC representatives are often appointed by the same colleagues 
they are supposed to oversee, their oversight is blunted by feelings of 
collegiality.125  LPCs can appoint and remove local officials for cause, but 
they are extremely limited in their choice of replacement candidates.126  
Local powerbrokers set the local government’s agenda with little 
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opposition, meaning implementation of national reform requires local 
buy-in.  Absent significant pressure from the national government, it is 
unrealistic to believe that LPCs would implement laws that went against 
their interest. 
The most important reason local governments are unlikely to 
implement consumer financial reform is that they depend on financial 
repression to underwrite their budgets.  As explained above, SOBs funnel 
consumer deposits to local governments in the form of state-sanctioned 
loans.  More directly, local governments seize citizens’ property and use 
this cheap capital to underwrite development projects on a terrific scale.  
These projects are an essential revenue stream:  such property sales were 
estimated to compose up to 70% of local government revenues in 2011.127 
Reforming China’s political economy to limit reliance on property 
sales would hurt consumers, likely forcing local governments to increase 
taxes to make up for any revenue shortfall.  If the tax increase was large 
enough, fast enough, and obvious enough, social harmony could be 
wrecked by angry taxpayers.  This is especially true if taxes were 
increased without legal reform sufficient to protect against future land 
seizures.  Any policy that could result in decreased social harmony would 
be looked on with skepticism by the national government.  Unless the 
national government offers localities another revenue stream to make up 
for the shortfall, local governments cannot meaningfully support an end to 
financial repression without undermining social harmony.128   Without 
widespread reform of the structure of local government, there can be no 
truly credible consumer protection reform, even if appropriate national 
legislation were in place. 
D. Reform is Unlikely Because too Many Powerful Individuals 
Personally Benefit from the Status Quo 
On top of the legitimate structural forces deterring reform, many 
officials and elites benefit from the status quo.  Unlike the efficiency 
arguments for maintaining China’s status quo at the expense of equity, or 
                                                
127 Louisa Lim, In China, Anger Spreads Over Government Land Grabs, NPR, Dec. 20, 
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Reynolds, Lost Voices of China’s Petitioners, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6420417.stm. 
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the structural complications of reforming state-owned industries, the 
judiciary, and local governments, this section argues that powerful people 
have strong personal incentives to avoid and subvert reform. 
Government corruption is perhaps the biggest roadblock to reform.  
Conviction of officials (at all levels of government) for bribery increased 
13% in the past decade; nearly ten thousand officials were charged in the 
first half of 2010 alone.129  This increase may be due in part to increased 
enforcement, and China’s truly vast scale; but for every official convicted, 
how many escape prosecution?  The bottom line is that instead of 
protecting citizens in local financial disputes, officials may accept bribes 
to stand up for the moneyed interests. 
Recently, LPCs were given some degree of authority to create 
“gap-filling” statutory amendments to apply national statutes to local 
problems. 130   In this capacity, LPCs would be responsible for 
implementing and enforcing many aspects of consumer protection laws.  
LPCs are far from democratic, although a multitude of opinions may be 
heard.131  Unfortunately, reform-oriented LPC members are deterred by 
the very real fear that they may be assaulted or disappeared by local 
powerbrokers if they go too far in protecting consumers against powerful 
interests.132  Any civic-minded desire to protect the people is balanced 
against a desire to protect their own lives, let alone their careers within the 
CCP.133 
Another significant issue is that local officials are evaluated for 
promotion to higher posts largely based upon achieving economic growth 
targets.  Local officials thus have a personal incentive to subjugate 
consumer protection to the needs of immediate industrial growth in order 
to advance their careers.134   Meeting growth targets by redeveloping 
dispossessed farmland is far easier than encouraging incremental 
economic growth among small businesses. 
The CCP also has a personal incentive to use financial repression 
to maintain its grip on power.  In China, as elsewhere, the rich get richer 
while the poor get poorer.135  Well-connected elites continue to prosper, 
creating a crucial base of support for the government. 136   Local 
powerbrokers and government officials can profit more easily through 
repressing consumers than through sustainable economic development 
based on consumer financial liberalization and strengthened rule of law.  
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Increased wealth also allows the government to increase its investment in 
political repression,137 which, in turn, relieves pressure to grant citizens’ 
rights.  The continued use of financial repression is necessary to buy the 
support of these elites, while the additional wealth transferred by 
repression grants the state more space to consolidate its power. 
 
IV. CHINA MUST MAINTAIN ITS FINANCIAL REPRESSION TO 
PREVENT INTERNAL ECONOMIC COLLAPSE 
Even if China’s political economy could undertake the massive 
political-legal reforms needed for consumer financial liberalization, for 
macro-economic reasons, reform in the near-term could be disastrous.  
Where many look at China and see unprecedented growth, peeking behind 
the curtains of its political-legal structure shows a more precarious 
situation.  This final section explains that without financial reform, 
China—and the world’s—economy is at risk.  But for these same reasons, 
China must not be too hasty in its reforms. 
China has created an unbalanced economy susceptible to shocks 
by focusing its energies on growth and repression, instead of investing in 
sustainable development.138  China is at risk from a growing real estate 
bubble and ballooning, non-performing debts.  Maintaining a regime of 
financial repression is an effective method for dealing with both of these 
problems.  While maintaining financial repression is the right choice for 
China today, in the long run it exacerbates the same problems it claims to 
solve and is incompatible with a modern consumer finance industry. 
A. China’s Debt Problem Perpetuates the Need for Financial 
Repression 
In recent years, China has run up trillions of dollars in debt.139  
China could have increasing trouble servicing these debts, despite its 
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138 Michael Schuman, China’s Economic Slowdown: Why Stimulus Is A Bad Idea, TIME, 
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growing economy.140  This weakness could be undermined rapidly by a 
shock to the system, such as from a bursting real estate bubble, resulting 
in defaults across China.  This may force China to recall its vast foreign 
exchange reserves, crippling the world economy.  Even if such an extreme 
scenario does not occur, the catastrophic risk posed by a debt crisis will 
require China to continue to use financial repression to minimize its debts 
and provide additional capital, at the expense of consumer financial 
reform. 
The leading thinkers on financial repression, economists Carmen 
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, argue that easing the repayment of 
government debt is a principle reason for which nations pursue financial 
repression.141  Financial repression allows nations to minimize debt in two 
respects.  On one side of the ledger, governments can minimize the 
amount of debt they must repay through controlling inflation.  On the 
other side, governments can use methods of shadow-taxation to boost 
revenue, providing additional funds for repayment.  Financial repression 
remains popular with governments because it allows them to effectively 
acquire additional capital to repay a decreased amount of debt without 
much public awareness or criticism. 
Chinese statistics are generally unreliable, but they clearly point to 
broad trends.142  In the twenty years since 1990, China’s foreign debt has 
increased from a negligible USD $52.5 billion to USD $548.9 billion, an 
increase of 1,045%.143  At the same time, China’s domestic debt increased 
from USD $93.46 billion in 1990 to at least an officially estimated at USD 
$1.66 trillion in 2011, a growth rate of 1,818%.144  Much of this debt is off 
of the central government’s books, issued to either local governments or to 
SOEs, but backed explicitly by government guarantees to the loan 
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issuers—SOBs.145  In 2009, total debt was estimated at 60% of GDP.146  In 
2011, it was estimated to be between 70–80% of GDP.147  Total loans to 
local governments’ financial vehicles are estimated to be between USD 
$2.3 and $3.8 trillion.148  These numbers are striking, both for their size 
and the velocity at which they are increasing.  And as noted above, while 
not guaranteed by the government, highly risky underground informal 
loans are estimated at USD $2.6 trillion.  These numbers become 
especially worrisome as investors start to worry about the health of 
China’s slowing economy.  One analyst has called China the “world’s 
most crowded short.”149 
China could be facing a “debt bomb,” a globally destructive debt-
based collapse explored by Reinhart and Rogoff in their survey, “A 
Decade of Debt.”150  Applying their model to China leads to troublesome 
conclusions.  In what can only be described as a massive Ponzi scheme, 
SOBs and local governments have leveraged loans upon loans to buy 
over-heated real estate assets.  Chinese financial regulations prevent banks 
from issuing loans to cover down payments on real estate mortgages.151  
To work around this, SOBs seeded loosely-regulated trust companies with 
billions of dollars of consumers’ capital.152  These trusts then loaned the 
money to financial vehicles created by local governments, which, in turn, 
used these loans as down payments to secure much larger mortgages on 
development projects financed by the same SOBs.153  The risk from these 
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investments is further exacerbated, because instead of building and then 
selling the development projects to generate cash flow, many local 
governments instead have further leveraged this already-leveraged land as 
collateral to mortgage additional property.154  Chinese regulators recently 
put an end to these practices, but there are now billions of dollars of 
hyper-leveraged mortgages taken out by revenue-poor local governments 
whose properties are susceptible to price shocks. 
These loans are becoming very dangerous—local governments 
have frequently pledged public infrastructure, like bridges and schools, as 
collateral; but the CCP would be unlikely to allow SOBs to seize these 
public goods to avoid disrupting social harmony.155  If local governments 
cannot service the loans, either the SOBs or the central government will 
need to eat the loss.  The number of local governments falling behind on 
their repayments appears troubling.  In Liaoning province, 85% of the one 
hundred and eighty-four local governments defaulted on their debt 
obligations in 2010, although this Chinese rustbelt province is probably 
aberrational.156  Despite the risks, many local governments will continue 
to look for methods to sidestep such national regulations.157 
In the event of default, the banks could also seize the mortgaged 
properties as collateral, if they preserve their value.  However, many 
experts warn of a major property market crash in China arising from 
property speculation linked to financially repressed middle-class 
consumers’ limited investment opportunities and local government 
development projects.158   In early 2011, Chinese property developers 
composed three of the ten largest “short” positions on Hong Kong’s stock 
market.159  At the same time, with inflation rates reaching a three-year 
high of around 6.5% in mid-2011,160 the middle-class’s biggest concern 
remains a lack of affordable housing.161  The government fears a shortage 
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of affordable housing could affect social stability162—yet because of local 
governments’ hyper-leveraged positions, national policies aimed at 
making housing affordable could bring down the banking system and local 
governments by preventing developers from selling their projects at their 
projected values.  It will be hard to please consumers, SOBs, and local 
governments. 
The CCP must maintain its financial repression in the face of the 
threat of a debt bomb.  Financial repression is used to drive up consumer 
deposits, the lubricant necessary to keep China’s economy moving 
smoothly.  These funds capitalize SOBs, SOEs, and local governments.  
As these entities face a debt bomb, they need the added boost from 
consumer deposits now, more than ever.  Consumer deposits present the 
government’s best defense against the debt bomb because it allows the 
government to recapitalize these entities with little public scrutiny.  
Financial reform that benefits consumers will not occur because it would 
withdraw support for these already unstable entities at a critical time. 
B. China’s Debt Problem: Implications 
If China does not handle its debt problem successfully, it could 
pull down the world economy.  Reinhart and Rogoff analyzed historical 
financial collapses to develop a model for “fast and furious” economic 
collapses.163  Applying their research to China proves sobering.  The 
SOB’s off-the-books debt could spark a “fast and furious” financial 
contagion if the Chinese financial system finds itself suddenly awash in 
unanticipated risk.  This crisis could easily spill beyond China’s 
borders.164 
Fast and furious contagions first begin with a surprise shock.165  
By definition, a surprise shock cannot be predicted.  Frequently, however, 
the collapse of a key bank or market sector ignites the first sparks.  And 
China’s markets are starting to appear unsteady. 
The second step in a fast and furious contagion comes when the 
surprise shock destabilizes an economy characterized by the presence of a 
housing bubble and massive foreign capital inflows, causing the surprise 
event to spiral out of control.166  Both conditions are present in China.  A 
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substantial number of real estate experts believe China is experiencing a 
real estate bubble. 167   Chinese government officials recently 
acknowledged that “hot flows” of foreign capital are negatively affecting 
the economy, though they plan to curb these influences.168  Although the 
total inflows are still relatively small, foreign banks increased their China 
exposure 86% in 2010, to their highest levels since record keeping 
began.169  The last time rates approached these levels, the Asian Financial 
Crisis washed over the continent.170  These investments could be seen as 
demonstrating investor confidence in China’s economy.  But the 
investments could also come from uncommitted investors chasing quick 
growth who plan to withdraw their capital at the first sign of trouble. 
Growing inflows also upset China’s attempts to control inflation 
and currency prices, destabilizing the larger framework on which its 
current export model is built.  Consequently, China will continue to 
strengthen its banking system through continued subsidization of SOBs 
with consumer deposits to cushion against any shocks.  These consumer 
deposits also provide capital necessary to maintain exchange rates and 
battle inflation.  Moreover, if past behavior is any indication, any risk of 
instability will be met with a tightening of control, not with 
liberalization,171 making reform unlikely if China experiences a downturn. 
If the banks are sufficiently weakened in the two first stages of a 
fast and furious collapse, the third stage of a global contagion could occur.  
Reinhart and Rogoff’s model describes situations where affected countries 
share a single lender which is forced to retrench when a sudden crisis in 
one nation forces it to withdraw capital from third-party nations, pulling 
each one down in turn.172  While China’s foreign debt is negligible, a 
contagion could spread through the inverse scenario:  in the event of a 
crisis at home, China may liquidate part of its USD $1.16 trillion holding 
of U.S. treasuries,173 unleashing massive turmoil in U.S. markets which 
would cascade throughout the world.174 
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Getting a handle on debt without disrupting social harmony may 
explain China’s continued choice of opaque financial repression as the 
preferred method for minimizing debt problems.  In conservative 
estimates, Chinese officials estimate China experiences approximately 
90,000 “mass incidents” every year.175  Public outcry in the United States 
was huge in the wake of the bank bailouts.  Outcry would likely be even 
greater in China if it had to openly bail out its SOBs.  Because the CCP 
views revolt as its biggest threat, it tries to bury unfavorable facts,176 and 
is likely to continue to use consumer deposits and cross-subsidies to 
cushion debt exposure instead of opting for outright bailouts.  The 
negative interest rate on deposits allows China to shrink debt without 
raising taxes, and consumers continue to be constrained to capitalize 
banks through their savings under the current system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
China is highly invested in the status quo, for economic and 
political reasons.  Financial repression is essential to the CCP’s policies 
for maintaining social stability, enabling it to remain in power while 
allowing the elites (often members of the CCP) to profit.  In the face of 
China’s growing internal debts and a weak world economy, the CCP will 
stick with financial repression to maintain growth, and to shield its 
economy.  To the extent that some leaders believe consumer financial 
reform is a necessary prerequisite for future stability and growth, some 
reform may be possible. 
It remains unlikely, though, that—with one of China’s most 
important leadership transitions in decades still under way—China’s 
leaders and institutions will be capable of undertaking serious reforms for 
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some time.177  Despite China’s high-level pledges to Treasury Secretary 
Geithner in May 2011 to minimize the anti-competitive effects of financial 
repression on foreign companies, 178  serious reform remains unlikely 
because the revenue generated through financial repression gives the 
nation an economic edge at a time when it seeks a larger role on a shifting 
world stage.  The overwhelming need to maintain economic growth in 
order to preserve social harmony indicates China is not interested in 
cannibalizing a lucrative, unperceived, and massive revenue stream arising 
from the shadow taxation of consumer finance in the near term.179  More 
importantly, without the economic boost of inexpensive capital provided 
through financial repression, China—and the world—could face grim 
economic consequences.  Consequently, China will not take the steps 
necessary to create a nourishing environment for consumer finance. 
Many experts have argued that the growth of capitalism in China 
would eventually lead to democratic reform.  As this article has shown, 
however, capitalism in China is not an independent force working against 
the Chinese Communist Party.  Instead, it is the CCP’s most important 
tool for governing and ensuring continued social harmony.  The 
beneficent effects of capitalism envisioned by experts are not derived from 
markets ex nihilo—they depend on a liberalized, rights-based version of 
consumer financial freedom. 
However, consumer financial liberalization is impossible without 
serious reform of the political-legal structure.  Consumer financial 
liberalization empowers citizens with a bundle of economic rights, which 
necessarily limit state power.  It allows citizens—not the state—to decide 
how to allocate capital, and it protects the consequences of those decisions 
from government seizure.  Once citizens taste these freedoms, they are 
likely to demand other rights.  A liberalized consumer financial regime 
would undermine the political and economic foundations on which 
modern China is built.  Therefore, even after ignoring all of the economic 
factors that argue against consumer financial liberalization, at the end of 
the day, liberalization will not occur because the prerequisite reforms to 
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the political-legal structure are so far beyond the status quo that nothing 
short of a top-to-bottom reform of China’s political economy would be 
sufficient. 
